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WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS?
The idea of human rights and the concept of a legal system are 
sometimes very uneasy bedfellows. The latter implies a set of 
principles and axioms in terms of which answers can be found 
(generally 'yes' or 'no') to defined questions. The former is a loose, 
open-textured set of generalisations owing much to the ingenuity of 
philosophers and political theorists, the opportunism of politicians 
and the moral fervour of activists campaigning against oppression. 
When we think 'human rights' our mindset is immediately formed 
by such global shorthand terms as apartheid South Africa, Allende's 
Chile, jackboots and so on. When we think of the stuff of a legal 
system, we visualise enforceable contracts, accidents at work and so 
on.
Yet despite the strongly positivist approach of British judges, the 
legal system shows clearly the influence of the thinking behind the 
concept of human rights. The judges themselves developed the right 
of silence and the writ of habeas corpus to protect the citizen against 
the oppression of the state, and the rhetoric of human rights can be 
heard from time to time in the courts of the realm. There will be 
much interest and fascination in the years to come in seeing how the 
courts react to the section in the Human Rights Act 1998 which has 
legislated to make it 'unlawful for a public authority [defined to 
include a court] to act in a way that is incompatible with a 
[European] Convention [on Human Rights] right'. And what will 
the judges make of the section which provides that 'so far as is 
possible to do so, primary and subordinate legislation must be read 
and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
Rights'? What will happen to our 'golden rule' and our other canons 
of statutory construction?
Aside from the interest and fascination, watch out for the 
paradoxes. We think of human rights as the protection of the poor 
and oppressed against the mighty and powerful and corrupt, David 
against Goliath. Our laws are the province of all, however, and the 
rich and the powerful are as likely to seek the protection of the 
Convention as the poor and oppressed   possibly even more likely 
given the ready availability to them of die resources needed to be a 
consumer of our legal system. Is a right to privacy equivalent to a 
right to say freely what one thinks? And aside from such perennial 
philosophical conundra, watch out for the paradox of human rights 
as an effective principle in commercial disputes.
Our courts have long taken the position that the ancient right of 
silence does not protect a bankrupt who refuses to answer questions 
put to him or her by the trustee in bankruptcy acting under 
statutory authority, even where to answer may incriminate the 
bankrupt. The House of Lords and the Court of Appeal (in Robert 
Maxwell related litigation) affirmed this principle in relation to 
erstwhile company directors of failed companies. This principle 
emerged from the judicial interpretation of the statute conferring 
the right on the trustee (or liquidator or administrator). How will 
this principle fare when attacked by the argument that such 
statutory powers must now be re-interpreted so as be made 
compatible with the ancient right of silence? One thing is certain. 
There will be no shortage of money to ensure that such arguments 
are heard loud and clear.
Professor Harry Rajak
